jev-skill-router
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script
scripts/skill_router.pyscans multiple local directories, including project-specific paths (.opencode/skills) and user-level configuration paths (~/.config/opencode/skills), to collect the names and descriptions of all installed skills. This metadata is then transmitted to an external service via thetypesafe-sdkAPI to perform task routing. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill lacks sufficient boundary markers when processing user-supplied queries, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where a malicious query could influence the routing logic or model behavior.
- Ingestion points: The
--querycommand-line argument inscripts/skill_router.pyis passed as thetaskparameter to thesystem_onemodel call. - Boundary markers: None. The query is interpolated directly into the model's state without delimiters or instructions to treat the content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: The script possesses the capability to read and output the full text of any
SKILL.mdfile found in the scanned directories if the--loadflag is provided. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the query string before it is sent to the routing model.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
typesafe-sdkandpyyamllibraries. These dependencies are fetched from external package registries to enable the skill's core routing and YAML parsing functionality.
Audit Metadata