jev-skill-router

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 20, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The script scripts/skill_router.py scans multiple local directories, including project-specific paths (.opencode/skills) and user-level configuration paths (~/.config/opencode/skills), to collect the names and descriptions of all installed skills. This metadata is then transmitted to an external service via the typesafe-sdk API to perform task routing.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill lacks sufficient boundary markers when processing user-supplied queries, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection attacks where a malicious query could influence the routing logic or model behavior.
  • Ingestion points: The --query command-line argument in scripts/skill_router.py is passed as the task parameter to the system_one model call.
  • Boundary markers: None. The query is interpolated directly into the model's state without delimiters or instructions to treat the content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The script possesses the capability to read and output the full text of any SKILL.md file found in the scanned directories if the --load flag is provided.
  • Sanitization: No validation or sanitization is performed on the query string before it is sent to the routing model.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the typesafe-sdk and pyyaml libraries. These dependencies are fetched from external package registries to enable the skill's core routing and YAML parsing functionality.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 20, 2026, 01:07 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — jev-skill-router