onboard
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 19, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses the
mvshell command to migrate existing user project folders into a new directory structure (~/Desktop/OS/). This process is transparent, providing a migration plan and requiring user confirmation before execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection (Category 8). It ingests content from external sources (Sent emails, Slack messages, Notion, and Google Drive) to build a "Voice DNA" profile without using boundary markers or sanitization. This allows malicious instructions embedded in those sources to potentially influence the agent's behavior when generating context files.
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill points users to the official Claude Desktop download site (
claude.ai/download) to enable tool integrations. This is a reference to a well-known, trusted service and does not involve executable downloads from unknown sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill sets up a self-correcting rules engine in the
CLAUDE.mdfile, instructing the agent to dynamically append and prioritize new rules based on future interactions. While intended for workspace personalization, this creates a mechanism for persistent instruction modification driven by runtime data.
Audit Metadata