hvs-skill-buddy

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The references/technology-registry.md file includes an installation command for Maestro that pipes a remote script directly into a shell (curl -Ls "https://get.maestro.mobile.dev" | bash). Although mobile.dev is a recognized service in the mobile testing industry, this method involves executing unverified code from a remote source.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The Audit Mode in SKILL.md utilizes shell commands such as wc, ls, and basename within a loop that iterates over directory structures in /mnt/skills/user/. These commands operate on file paths that could be influenced by external content.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because its core functionality involves ingesting and analyzing untrusted SKILL.md files from a shared library directory. * Ingestion points: The skill reads the contents of SKILL.md files located in /mnt/skills/user/*/. * Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions to the agent to disregard commands or instructions found within the audited files. * Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to execute shell commands, run Python scripts, and copy files to output directories. * Sanitization: The audit-skills.py script uses regular expressions for pattern matching but does not perform sanitization or escaping of the ingested text before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Jun 16, 2026, 01:14 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — hvs-skill-buddy