api-filtering-sorting
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill provides multiple reference implementations that ingest untrusted user data from query parameters to dynamically construct database queries. For example,
references/advanced-filter-parser.mdandreferences/python-filtering-sqlalchemy.mddemonstrate patterns for mapping user-supplied keys and values to database operators like MongoDB's$regexor SQLAlchemy's attribute access viagetattr. This creates an attack surface where an attacker could potentially perform Regular Expression Denial of Service (ReDoS) or access unauthorized fields if the developer does not implement the whitelisting strategies recommended in the skill's Best Practices section.\n - Ingestion points: Query parameters are ingested in
references/advanced-filter-parser.md(viaURLSearchParams),references/python-filtering-sqlalchemy.md(viarequest.args), andreferences/query-parameter-filtering.md(viareq.query).\n - Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are used within the parsing logic to separate user data from query logic, increasing the risk of injection.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill enables the agent to generate code that performs database read operations via MongoDB (
find,countDocuments), SQLAlchemy (filter,order_by), and Elasticsearch (search).\n - Sanitization: While
references/query-parameter-filtering.mdincludes anallowedFilterswhitelist, the more generic implementations inreferences/advanced-filter-parser.mdandreferences/python-filtering-sqlalchemy.mdlack built-in validation, relying entirely on external enforcement.
Audit Metadata