docx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to use
sudofor installing system dependencies likepandoc,libreoffice, andpoppler-utils. This encourages privilege escalation during the setup phase. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow requires the agent to generate and execute custom Python and JavaScript/TypeScript scripts for XML manipulation and document generation. It also involves running system utilities such as
pandoc,soffice, andpdftoppmto process external files. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill contains behavioral overrides, specifically mandating that the agent 'NEVER' set range limits when reading reference documentation files (
docx-js.md,ooxml.md). This attempts to bypass standard agent tool constraints for context management and file reading. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is subject to indirect prompt injection risks as it is designed to ingest and process untrusted
.docxfiles from external sources. - Ingestion points: Document files are read via
pandocfor markdown conversion or unpacked into XML for direct editing (SKILL.md, ooxml.md). - Boundary markers: The instructions do not include the use of delimiters or specific warnings to ignore instructions that might be embedded within the document content.
- Capability inventory: Across its scripts and documentation, the agent is granted capabilities for shell command execution, file system modification, and the ability to write and run scripts (SKILL.md, docx-js.md, ooxml.md).
- Sanitization: While the skill recommends using
defusedxmlfor secure XML parsing to prevent XXE attacks, there is no mention of sanitizing or filtering the actual textual content extracted from the documents.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata