browser
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 15, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDATA_EXFILTRATIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The
start.jsscript allows the agent to copy the user's actual browser profile (containing cookies and logins) into a temporary workspace. This exposes sensitive personal credentials and session data to the environment. - Evidence:
cpSync(defaultProfile, join(tempProfile, 'Default'), { recursive: true });instart.jsspecifically targets the user's Chrome data directory. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The
eval.jstool takes arbitrary strings provided as arguments and executes them usingeval()within the browser's JavaScript environment. - Evidence:
return await eval("(async () => ${expr})()");ineval.jsenables remote execution of any JavaScript logic passed to the skill. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill launches the Chrome browser by spawning a system process with specific debugging and profile flags.
- Evidence:
spawn(chromePath, chromeArgs, { detached: true, stdio: 'ignore' });instart.jsexecutes the browser binary from the host system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to navigate to and interact with external websites, making it vulnerable to indirect prompt injection where malicious instructions on a webpage could control the agent's next actions.
- Ingestion points: Web content retrieved via
nav.jsandeval.js. - Boundary markers: None; there are no delimiters or instructions to treat web content as untrusted data.
- Capability inventory: Ability to spawn processes, access the file system (via profile copying), and execute arbitrary JavaScript code.
- Sanitization: None; raw output from the browser DOM is returned directly to the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata