gh-pr
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches untrusted data from GitHub PR comments and review bodies, which are then used as instructions for the agent to implement fixes.
- Ingestion points: The helper script
scripts/gh_pr_ops.tsfetches comments using thegh apicommand in thefetchUnifiedfunction. - Boundary markers: The skill does not implement delimiters or warnings to the LLM to ignore instructions embedded within the fetched GitHub comments.
- Capability inventory: According to
SKILL.md, the agent is expected to "Implement the requested fix", "Verify", "Commit", and "Push" based on the content of the comments. This provides a high-impact capability surface for malicious instructions inside PR comments. - Sanitization: No sanitization or filtering of the comment body is performed beyond checking for a bot prefix and existing reactions.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a TypeScript helper script
scripts/gh_pr_ops.tsthat executes the GitHub CLI (gh) viaexecFileSync. - Evidence: The
runGhandrunGhGraphqlfunctions inscripts/gh_pr_ops.tsusenode:child_processto execute shell commands. While the use ofexecFileSyncwith an argument array prevents standard shell injection, the skill still grants the agent the ability to interact with the GitHub API using the user's credentials.
Audit Metadata