plannotator-setup-goal
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow in
SKILL.mddefines shell command execution patterns that directly interpolate user-controlled variables into a command line string. In Step 4, the agent is directed to executepython3 <skill_dir>/scripts/scaffold_goal.py --root . --slug <slug> --title "<goal title>" --objective "<one sentence outcome>". If the user-supplied values for these placeholders contain shell metacharacters (e.g., semicolons, backticks, or pipe symbols), a malicious user could achieve arbitrary command execution on the host system, depending on how the agent platform handles placeholder replacement. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted user data to generate high-privilege instructions for a downstream agent ("Codex").
- Ingestion points: As noted in
SKILL.md, the agent gathers a goal name, objective, and context directly from the user to populate the goal package. - Boundary markers: The generated
goal-prompt.mdfile and the final prompt instructions inSKILL.mddo not utilize clear delimiters or system instructions to distinguish user-provided content from the agent's core instructions. This allows instructions embedded within a user's objective to potentially manipulate the downstream agent's behavior. - Capability inventory: The skill possesses the capability to write multiple files to the local file system using
scripts/scaffold_goal.pyand to invoke external tools likeplannotatorvia the shell. - Sanitization: The
scripts/scaffold_goal.pyscript lacks sanitization logic for the--titleand--objectiveinputs before they are written into markdown files, ensuring that any malicious payloads provided by a user are persisted into the project's durable planning documents.
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