video-understand
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto execute system commands for video processing, includingffmpeg,ffprobe,yt-dlp, andwhisper. Evidence includes multiple instances inscripts/process_video.pywhere commands are executed using the recommended list format to prevent shell injection. A utility function in the setup script (scripts/setup.py) usesshell=Truebut is not invoked in the primary operational logic.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill downloads video content from user-specified URLs using theyt-dlptool. This is a core functionality performed inscripts/process_video.pyvia thedownload_videofunction. The skill also recommends installing standard, well-known Python packages and system utilities from official repositories.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external video data that could potentially contain adversarial instructions designed to influence the AI's behavior.\n - Ingestion points: User-provided video sources (YouTube URLs or local files) processed in
scripts/process_video.py.\n - Boundary markers: Absent; the skill does not implement explicit delimiters or warnings for the AI when processing interpolated video data.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
subprocess.runfor local tool execution (inscripts/setup.py,scripts/check_providers.py, andscripts/process_video.py) and performs network operations (inscripts/process_video.py) usinggoogle.generativeai,openai,groq,assemblyai, anddeepgramlibraries.\n - Sanitization: Absent; no validation or filtering of content extracted from video files is performed before processing.\n
- Note: This represents an inherent risk in multimodal data processing that is mitigated by the safety guardrails of the AI providers used.
Audit Metadata