cso
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The preamble automatically runs several shell commands to manage sessions, check for updates, and modify project files such as
CLAUDE.mdand.gitignoreupon skill load.\n- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill dynamically executes command output usingsource <(...)andevalon the output of local binaries. It also executes scripts from the~/.claude/skills/gstack/bin/and~/.claude/skills/gstack/gstack-upgrade/directories, which are external to the skill's own package.\n- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: Telemetry data, including skill usage statistics, repository names, and session identifiers, is collected and can be transmitted to a remote service via thegstack-telemetry-logbinary, although user prompts for opt-out are provided.\n- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted content from repository files and other installed skills during its auditing phases (e.g., Phase 8). Evidence chain: 1. Ingestion points include project code, config files, and other skill definitions; 2. Boundary markers are limited to natural language instructions (e.g., "Anti-manipulation" rule); 3. The skill possesses powerful tools includingBash,Agent, andWrite; 4. No explicit sanitization or structural isolation is performed on the audited content.
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