omp-delegate
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates shell commands that incorporate user-provided prompts (e.g.,
omp -p "<prompt>"). The use of double quotes for the placeholder is insufficient to prevent shell command substitution; an attacker could provide a prompt containing$(...)or backticks to execute arbitrary commands on the host machine. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion point for untrusted instructions that are passed to a secondary agent environment.
- Ingestion points: Multiple shell command examples in
SKILL.mdingest untrusted text via the<prompt>,<prompt A>, and<prompt B>placeholders. - Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to separate the delegated prompt from the execution environment.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution for the
ompCLI,jqfor JSON processing, andpython3for data extraction. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before interpolation into shell commands.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
python3 -cto execute a short Python script for parsing session IDs from JSON output. While the script itself is a fixed template, it represents the execution of logic passed via command-line arguments.
Audit Metadata