skills/akhy/agent-skills/omp-delegate/Gen Agent Trust Hub

omp-delegate

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 1, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill generates shell commands that incorporate user-provided prompts (e.g., omp -p "<prompt>"). The use of double quotes for the placeholder is insufficient to prevent shell command substitution; an attacker could provide a prompt containing $(...) or backticks to execute arbitrary commands on the host machine.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill acts as an ingestion point for untrusted instructions that are passed to a secondary agent environment.
  • Ingestion points: Multiple shell command examples in SKILL.md ingest untrusted text via the <prompt>, <prompt A>, and <prompt B> placeholders.
  • Boundary markers: No boundary markers or 'ignore' instructions are used to separate the delegated prompt from the execution environment.
  • Capability inventory: The skill utilizes shell command execution for the omp CLI, jq for JSON processing, and python3 for data extraction.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation, escaping, or sanitization before interpolation into shell commands.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses python3 -c to execute a short Python script for parsing session IDs from JSON output. While the script itself is a fixed template, it represents the execution of logic passed via command-line arguments.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 1, 2026, 07:13 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — omp-delegate