agentation
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the installation of the
agentationandagentation-mcppackages from NPM, as well as the 'upstream official skill' from a third-party GitHub repository (benjitaylor/agentation). These sources are not verified or managed by the platform. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the user to execute remote code via
npx -y agentation-mcp serverandnpx skills add benjitaylor/agentation -g. These commands download and run code from external registries without integrity verification. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The included setup script (
scripts/setup-agentation-mcp.sh) modifies several AI agent configuration files in the user's home directory, including~/.claude/claude_desktop_config.json,~/.codex/config.toml,~/.gemini/settings.json, and~/.config/opencode/opencode.json. It appends a startup command that automatically executes theagentation-mcpserver, establishing a persistence mechanism for the external code. The script also uses dynamic execution of a Python heredoc to perform TOML validation. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection due to its ingestion of untrusted external data.
- Ingestion points: The skill processes "structured packets" containing UI selectors, element paths, and human reviewer comments captured by a browser toolbar.
- Boundary markers: The skill does not define specific delimiters or "ignore previous instructions" warnings to wrap these incoming packets.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes the
Read,Write,Bash,Grep, andGlobtools, enabling the agent to modify the project's source code or execute shell commands based on the external UI feedback. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or strict schema validation for the element paths or comments before they are interpreted by the agent.
Audit Metadata