airship
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCREDENTIALS_UNSAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions direct the agent to execute code from a remote source via
npx @airshiplabs/cli, which fetches and runs a package without verification of the package author or contents (SKILL.md). - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill depends on unverified third-party packages such as
@airshiplabs/cliandopencode-aifrom the NPM registry, and the Homebrew tapsst/tap/opencode(SKILL.md, references/commands.md). - [CREDENTIALS_UNSAFE]: The documentation references paths to sensitive authentication files such as
~/.claudeand~/.codex/auth.json, and environment variables likeAWS_ACCESS_KEY_ID, which increases the risk of credential discovery and harvesting (references/commands.md). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The CLI tool supported by this skill includes an
--execflag that allows the execution of arbitrary shell commands as part of the dev server lifecycle, providing a vector for command injection (references/commands.md). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses a surface for indirect prompt injection where data from external HTML can influence code generation. Ingestion points: HTML elements selected via the Airship visual proxy (SKILL.md). Boundary markers: None identified. Capability inventory: The agent has Bash, Read, Write, and Edit tools enabled, and the CLI allows arbitrary execution (SKILL.md, references/commands.md). Sanitization: No sanitization of the ingested UI data is described.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata