codeburn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDATA_EXFILTRATIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill fetches the
codeburnpackage and dependencies likebetter-sqlite3from the public npm registry vianpx,npm,bunx, andpnpm. It also instructs the user to install binaries through Homebrew (brew install codeburn). - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The instructions encourage immediate execution of remote scripts using
npx codeburnandbunx codeburn, which download and run code in a single step without local verification of the contents. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes shell commands that modify the local environment and the agent's own configuration, specifically through
codeburn guard install, which writes to~/.claude/settings.jsonand~/.config/codeburn/guard.json. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill includes a
syncfeature (codeburn sync setup <url>andcodeburn sync push) that allows users to configure an external endpoint and transmit usage metadata, including project names and token costs, to that server. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill presents an indirect prompt injection surface by ingesting and processing untrusted data from session logs.
- Ingestion points: The tool reads local session files from approximately 40 different AI coding tools (e.g., Claude Code, Cursor, Codex) stored in directories like
~/.claude/. - Boundary markers: There are no explicit delimiters or instructions provided to the agent to disregard embedded commands within the log data being parsed.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andGreptools. - Sanitization: There is no mention of sanitization or escaping of the session log content before it is processed or exposed to the agent via the
codeburn mcptools (get_usage,get_savings).
Audit Metadata