moli
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 14, 2026
Risk Level: CRITICALREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions include commands to download and immediately execute shell and PowerShell scripts from a remote repository. This "curl-pipe-bash" pattern is a critical security risk as it runs unverified code with the user's permissions.
- Evidence:
curl --proto '=https' --tlsv1.2 -fsSL https://github.com/lexmount/moli/releases/latest/download/moli-installer.sh | sh(SKILL.md)irm https://github.com/lexmount/moli/releases/latest/download/moli-installer.ps1 | iex(SKILL.md)- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill extensively uses the
Bashtool to run themolibinary with various flags, including those that manipulate the local file system and network configuration. - Evidence: Examples in SKILL.md and references/commands.md show the use of the
Bashtool for installation and tool execution. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests untrusted data from external websites and processes it within the agent's context while maintaining powerful system capabilities.
- Ingestion points:
moli fetchoutput (Markdown, HTML, JSON, and semantic tree data) read from arbitrary URLs. - Boundary markers: The skill includes a 'Best Practice' recommendation for the agent to ignore in-page instructions, which serves as a mitigation but does not fully eliminate the risk.
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Read,Write,Edit,Glob, andGreptools, allowing an injection to potentially trigger file modifications or command execution. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of automated sanitization or filtering of the retrieved web content before it is processed by the agent.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata