react-grab
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 28, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill repeatedly directs the agent to execute
npx -y grab@latest. The package 'grab' on the npm registry is an unrelated legacy project and does not correspond to the 'react-grab' tool described in the skill metadata and documentation. This constitutes a typosquatting attack designed to execute arbitrary code from an unintended source. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The inclusion of the
-yflag in all recommended commands (e.g.,npx -y grab@latest init) intentionally silences safety prompts that would normally warn a user before installing and running an unknown package. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill facilitates the download and execution of external scripts from the npm registry and unpkg CDN.
- Evidence:
src="//unpkg.com/react-grab/dist/index.global.js"is injected into framework configuration files. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shell scripts (
scripts/install.sh,scripts/add-agent.sh) to perform environment setup, which in turn execute further commands and package managers without sufficient validation of the downloaded binaries. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection by design, as it ingests untrusted data from live browser environments.
- Ingestion points: The
get_element_contexttool and clipboard workflow capture HTML snippets, component names, and stack traces from external websites. - Boundary markers: Absent; there are no instructions to use delimiters or ignore embedded commands within the captured context.
- Capability inventory: The agent possesses
Bash,Write,Edit, andWebFetchcapabilities, which could be abused if the agent is subverted by malicious content in the browser UI. - Sanitization: Absent; the skill does not mandate filtering or escaping of the HTML or metadata captured from the browser.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata