agentation
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates the injection of untrusted user data (UI annotations) into the agent's prompt via platform-specific hooks described in the installation instructions.
- Ingestion points: Ingestion occurs via the
UserPromptSubmithook for Claude Code and theAfterAgenthook for Gemini CLI defined inSKILL.md. These hooks fetch external data from a local server. - Boundary markers: Present. The skill uses clear delimiters such as
=== AGENTATION: {c} UI annotations ===and=== END ===to wrap the injected content. - Capability inventory: The skill allows the agent to use
Read,Write,Bash,Grep, andGlobtools, providing a wide surface for potential misuse if the injected instructions are obeyed. - Sanitization: Absent. The Python processing script in the hook directly prints the
commentfield from the retrieved JSON data without any escaping or validation logic. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The integration instructions recommend configuring hooks that execute shell commands involving piping network data from
localhostto a Python interpreter (curl ... | python3 -c). While this is used for localized data processing rather than remote script execution, the pattern of piping network-sourced data to an interpreter involves inherent risks if the local service is compromised.
Recommendations
- HIGH: Downloads and executes remote code from: http://localhost:4747/pending - DO NOT USE without thorough review
Audit Metadata