omx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 6, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill instructions and documentation (in both
SKILL.mdandSKILL.toon) recommend using the--madmaxflag, which is explicitly defined as mapping to the--dangerously-bypass-approvals-and-sandboxflag in the Codex CLI. This instruction directs the AI to ignore its standard safety protocols and execution restrictions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill requires the global installation of the
oh-my-codexpackage via NPM. This dependency originates from a third-party repository (Yeachan-Heo/oh-my-codex) and executes with system-level permissions. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The orchestration layer features a hook extension system that dynamically loads and executes Javascript modules (
.mjs) from the.omx/hooks/directory. This runtime execution of local plugins allows for arbitrary code execution during the session lifecycle. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill serves as a multi-agent orchestration framework that processes untrusted user input across various specialized roles.
- Ingestion points: User-provided task strings passed to commands like
$autopilot,$plan, and$teaminSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not specify any delimiters or safety markers to isolate user-provided data from agent instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses powerful system tools including
Bashfor shell command execution andWritefor modifying the filesystem. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of input validation or sanitization before user-supplied tasks are interpolated into the orchestration pipeline.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on the execution of the
omxCLI tool for setup, diagnostics, and team orchestration, which in turn manages subprocesses and parallel workers in tmux.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata