unity-input-system

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Apr 25, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The instruction in references/runtime-checklist.md advises the agent to use cargo run -- <args> if the unity-cli binary is not found on the PATH and the workspace is the repository. This is a dynamic execution pattern that allows the agent to compile and run whatever code is present in the current workspace, posing a risk if the workspace contains malicious or untrusted source files.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill utilizes network-based tool routing via unity-cli system ping and unity-cli instances set-active <host:port>. While these are standard for managing Unity Editor instances, they provide the agent with network communication capabilities that could be misused if host/port parameters are manipulated to point to external or malicious endpoints.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted input through asset paths, map names, and action names which are interpolated into shell commands (e.g., unity-cli raw create_action_map --json '...').
  • Ingestion points: User-provided strings for asset paths and configuration names in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: Arguments are wrapped in JSON strings, but there are no explicit instructions for the agent to sanitize or escape shell metacharacters within those strings.
  • Capability inventory: The skill uses Bash(unity-cli:*) as specified in the allowed-tools section of SKILL.md.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic or validation steps are provided before passing these inputs to the CLI tool.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Apr 25, 2026, 02:58 PM