strategy-awareness

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the open command (or its platform equivalent) to launch a default web browser and display a dynamically generated HTML file (~/.claude/strategy-view.html).
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill modifies the agent's persistent configuration by appending a pointer to ~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. This file governs the agent's behavior across sessions, making it a target for persistent instruction injection.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its data processing cycle.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via conversational capture (MODE 2) and is stored in ~/.claude/strategy.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; data is stored as markdown lists/paragraphs without isolation or security delimiters.
  • Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write access to sensitive directories and the ability to execute system commands (open).
  • Sanitization: None; the instructions explicitly mandate preserving original user language and quotes verbatim.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and manages files within the ~/.claude/ directory. This is a sensitive location typically housing the agent's internal configuration, instructions, and operational state.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The visualization template (strategy-view-template.html) fetches styling assets from well-known Google font services (fonts.googleapis.com and fonts.gstatic.com).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 22, 2026, 07:29 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — strategy-awareness