strategy-awareness
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 22, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes the
opencommand (or its platform equivalent) to launch a default web browser and display a dynamically generated HTML file (~/.claude/strategy-view.html). - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill modifies the agent's persistent configuration by appending a pointer to
~/.claude/CLAUDE.md. This file governs the agent's behavior across sessions, making it a target for persistent instruction injection. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection through its data processing cycle.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context via conversational capture (MODE 2) and is stored in
~/.claude/strategy.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; data is stored as markdown lists/paragraphs without isolation or security delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-write access to sensitive directories and the ability to execute system commands (
open). - Sanitization: None; the instructions explicitly mandate preserving original user language and quotes verbatim.
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and manages files within the
~/.claude/directory. This is a sensitive location typically housing the agent's internal configuration, instructions, and operational state. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The visualization template (
strategy-view-template.html) fetches styling assets from well-known Google font services (fonts.googleapis.comandfonts.gstatic.com).
Audit Metadata