gemini-text
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONMETADATA_POISONING
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXPOSURE]: The
scripts/generate.jsscript allows reading any local file provided via the--imagecommand-line argument usingnode:fs/promises.readFile. This data is encoded to base64 and transmitted to an external API without validating the file path or ensuring the file is an image. While intended for multimodal processing, this creates a vector for an agent to read sensitive local files if tricked by a prompt. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]:
- Ingestion points: The skill accepts untrusted user input via the
promptargument and--systemflag inscripts/generate.js. - Boundary markers: There are no delimiters or specific instructions provided to the agent to prevent it from obeying instructions embedded within the processed text or image content.
- Capability inventory: The skill possesses file-read capabilities (
node:fs/promises) and network access to Google's API endpoints. - Sanitization: Input data is interpolated directly into the model request without any form of escaping or validation.
- [METADATA_POISONING]: Both
SKILL.mdandreferences/models.mdcontain references toGemini 3and aJanuary 2026knowledge cutoff. These are misleading claims regarding current model availability and capabilities, which could lead to misjudgment of the tool's behavior or safety.
Audit Metadata