atlas
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 31, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a protocol runner (
scripts/_skill_protocol_runtime.py) that manages the execution of other local scripts. It utilizessubprocess.runwithshell=Falseto invoke internal tools likestructure_state.py,freshness_state.py, andrepository_guidance.py. This execution is strictly bound to the skill's manifest and local file paths. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes project-level files and user-authored Markdown in the
.map/directory to generate orientation cues and navigation blocks. This creates a surface for indirect prompt injection if project files contain malicious instructions meant to influence the agent's summary; however, the skill uses explicit boundary markers (<!-- ATLAS -->) and is limited to its primary role of filesystem mapping. - Ingestion points: Reads files in the repository root and
.map/directory for hashing and link validation. - Boundary markers: Uses
<!-- ATLAS -->and<!-- /ATLAS -->comments to delineate managed sections inAGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.md. - Capability inventory: File reading, file writing (limited to repo-root guidance files and state JSON), and local subprocess execution.
- Sanitization: Content written to guidance blocks is derived from Landmark titles and paragraphs, with some validation for plain-text content.
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: In
scripts/_skill_protocol_runtime.py, the skill usesimportlib.import_moduleto dynamically load a local utility script (_diagnostic_contract.py). This is a benign use of dynamic imports for internal code organization.
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