blueprint
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 14, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
subprocess.runto interact with Git for repository inspection (e.g., status, diff) and to execute local helper scripts within the skill directory. - Evidence: Found in
scripts/blueprint_runtime.py,scripts/architecture_handoff.py, andscripts/_skill_protocol_runtime.py. - Context: These calls are used for legitimate repository state assessment and protocol implementation. All calls are configured with
shell=Falseand target known local scripts or thegitbinary. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill employs
importlib.import_moduleto load internal modules for handling different architecture and planning artifacts. - Evidence:
scripts/blueprint_runtime.pyandscripts/_skill_protocol_runtime.pyuse dynamic imports to load sibling scripts likearchitecture_handoff.py. - Context: This is a standard Python pattern for modular codebases and does not involve loading or executing code from untrusted external sources.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process external request and architecture files, which could serve as a vector for indirect prompt injection if those files contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points:
scripts/blueprint_runtime.pyandscripts/architecture_handoff.pyparse content from repository files cited in a task request. - Boundary markers: The skill's instructions in
references/delegation-protocol.mdprovide a strong mitigation by explicitly directing the agent to ignore any instructions found within source files. - Capability inventory: The skill's capabilities are limited to Git inspection and writes confined to the
.first-four-hours/blueprints/workspace. - Sanitization: The
blueprint_runtime.pyscript enforces a strict grammar for generated blueprints, including filters to prevent the use of shell interpreters or mutating Git commands in the plan's verification sections.
Audit Metadata