router
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 12, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill modifies the target repository's local Git configuration by appending ignore rules to the
.git/info/excludefile. It specifically hides the/.first-four-hours/routes/directory from standard version control checks likegit status. This concealment mechanism reduces the visibility of the skill's artifacts and modifications within the project environment. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill interacts with the Git CLI through
subprocess.run()calls inscripts/route_workspace.pyandscripts/seal_route.py. It performs operations such asrev-parse,check-ignore, andls-filesto manage its workspace. These high-privilege commands allow direct manipulation of repository metadata and file status. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The execution runtime uses
importlib.import_module()to dynamically load diagnostic modules. It also implements a manifest-driven execution model wheresubprocess.run()is used to launch scripts with arguments constructed from templates and user-provided input, increasing the complexity of the execution flow. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests content from an external draft file and persists it in the repository, presenting an attack surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The content of the file specified by the
--draftargument inscripts/seal_route.py. - Boundary markers: The script performs structural validation based on markdown headers but does not sanitize the internal prompt instructions.
- Capability inventory: The skill has permissions to write files to the repository and modify Git ignore rules.
- Sanitization: No sanitization or escaping of the ingested draft content is performed before storage.
Audit Metadata