biz-ops-setup
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 8, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and summarize data from untrusted external sources, such as Teams chat logs, email communications, and external project folders (via the
Check-ExternalFolders.ps1script). This creates an attack surface where malicious instructions embedded in these logs could attempt to influence the agent's behavior during report generation or 1on1 preparation. - Ingestion points: Manual paste of chat/email data into the
data-collectoragent, synchronization of external files from monitored folders, and workIQ (M365) log retrieval. - Boundary markers: Although the
data-collectoragent applies YAML frontmatter to normalized data, the prompt templates (e.g.,daily-report.prompt.template.md) do not provide strong delimitation or explicit instructions for the LLM to ignore embedded commands within the activity content. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and edit files, execute terminal commands (
run/terminalingeneral-worker), and run local scripts that interact with the system. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of content sanitization or instruction-filtering applied to external logs before they are processed by the reporting agents.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill includes a Python script (
assets/scripts/collect_daily_activity.py) that usessubprocess.runto executegit logcommands for activity evidence collection. While the script uses parameterized arguments to avoid shell injection, it represents an automated interaction with the local file system and version control tools. Additionally, thegeneral-workeragent is whitelisted for therun/terminaltool to handle unclassified tasks.
Audit Metadata