claude-paper-study
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 25, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [UNVERIFIABLE_DEPENDENCIES]: The skill executes
npm installandpython3 -m pip install pymupdfduring its initial setup. Automated installation of packages from public registries or the local plugin directory can introduce supply chain risks if dependencies are not pinned to specific versions or vetted for security.\n- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The workflow relies on executing various Node.js and Python scripts (e.g.,download-pdf.cjs,parse-pdf.js,extract-images.py) located within the resolved plugin directory. These scripts handle file system operations and external downloads.\n- [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to download PDFs from user-supplied URLs, including arXiv links. While this is the intended purpose, it involves fetching and processing content from external, untrusted sources.\n- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill generates runnable Python scripts, Jupyter notebooks, and interactive HTML explorers based on the content of the analyzed PDFs. This creates a surface where logic derived from untrusted input is converted into executable or active content.\n- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted PDF data which is then used by the agent to generate code and documentation. \n - Ingestion points: The
paper.txtfile and metadata generated by the PDF parser serve as the primary input for all generated materials.\n - Boundary markers: The instructions lack explicit delimiters or warnings to the agent to ignore potential instructions embedded within the research papers.\n
- Capability inventory: The skill has access to
Bash,Write,Edit, andReadtools, providing a significant range of actions that could be abused if the agent follows malicious instructions hidden in a document.\n - Sanitization: There is no specified sanitization or filtering process for the extracted text before it is processed by the agent.
Audit Metadata