skills/alamops/skills/appstore-seo/Gen Agent Trust Hub

appstore-seo

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 3, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from external sources like app reviews, which represents a potential attack surface where malicious text could influence agent behavior during processing.
  • Ingestion points: Metadata and review feeds fetched from itunes.apple.com and apps.apple.com in references/data-and-endpoints.md.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions to disregard embedded content are used when the agent processes customer review text.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has network access via urllib.request and writes data to the docs/appstore/ directory.
  • Sanitization: Employs JSON parsing and HTML unescaping, but review content is directly used for keyword mining without further filtering.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches application metadata, subtitle data, and competitor listings from well-known official Apple and Google Play Store domains.
  • Evidence: Documented urllib.request and curl calls in references/data-and-endpoints.md targeting itunes.apple.com, apps.apple.com, and play.google.com.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: Provides pre-defined Python snippets for the agent to execute locally for character-limit validation and data parsing.
  • Evidence: Character counting and shelf parsing logic in references/validation.md and references/data-and-endpoints.md using standard library modules.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: Instructs the agent to use shell commands such as curl as an alternative method for fetching store metadata.
  • Evidence: curl recipe provided in references/data-and-endpoints.md §2 for retrieving store page content.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 3, 2026, 03:38 AM