skills/alannkl/skills/learn-from/Gen Agent Trust Hub

learn-from

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 6, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSDATA_EXFILTRATIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to process untrusted external data to modify local instruction files and configurations, creating a significant attack surface.
  • Ingestion points: Step 2 in SKILL.md explicitly accepts raw sources such as external URLs, remote repositories, and conversation transcripts.
  • Boundary markers: There are no defined delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the ingested sources.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can read local artifacts (docs, configs, codebases), invoke the study tool on external content, and write/apply changes to local files (Steps 1, 2, and 5 in SKILL.md).
  • Sanitization: The skill lacks security sanitization, relying instead on a qualitative "grading" process by the model based on "fit" and "evidence".
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The workflow requires fetching content from arbitrary, user-provided remote locations.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md Step 2 states it will "Accept raw sources (URLs, repositories, files...)".
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses and processes sensitive local files which could be exposed if the analysis tool or the agent's context is compromised by a malicious source.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md Step 1 identifies targets such as "config" and "codebase module" for reading and analysis.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs file system modifications and version control operations based on analysis of external data.
  • Evidence: SKILL.md Step 5 describes applying picked changes and performing git commits ("Commit only when asked").
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 6, 2026, 07:38 PM