skills/alannkl/skills/retrospect/Gen Agent Trust Hub

retrospect

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive session logs and transcripts from several agent platforms (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Antigravity) stored in the user's home directory (e.g., ~/.claude, ~/.cursor). These files contain a comprehensive history of user prompts, agent reasoning, and tool execution logs.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The helper script collect-messages.py performs a broad scan of the filesystem starting from the root directory (/) to resolve Cursor project slugs into absolute paths, which involves reading directory names across the system.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from past session transcripts to generate improvements for future agent behavior.
  • Ingestion points: Session log files (.jsonl) and database files (.db) located in ~/.claude, ~/.codex, ~/.cursor, and ~/.gemini as processed by the collect-messages.py script.
  • Boundary markers: The skill instructions specify filtering for human-typed messages and paraphrasing findings rather than quoting raw transcript text, though the effectiveness of these boundaries depends on the model's adherence during the mining process.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify project instruction files (like AGENTS.md and CLAUDE.md) and create or edit other agent skills using the create-agent-skill and writing-for-agents tools.
  • Sanitization: While the collection script filters for human-typed messages, the subsequent 'mining' step involves interpreting transcripts which may contain unsanitized reasoning or tool results from previous sessions that could contain malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Oct 9, 2026, 07:26 PM