retrospect
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 9, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEDATA_EXFILTRATIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The skill accesses highly sensitive session logs and transcripts from several agent platforms (Claude Code, Codex, Cursor, and Antigravity) stored in the user's home directory (e.g.,
~/.claude,~/.cursor). These files contain a comprehensive history of user prompts, agent reasoning, and tool execution logs. - [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The helper script
collect-messages.pyperforms a broad scan of the filesystem starting from the root directory (/) to resolve Cursor project slugs into absolute paths, which involves reading directory names across the system. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from past session transcripts to generate improvements for future agent behavior.
- Ingestion points: Session log files (
.jsonl) and database files (.db) located in~/.claude,~/.codex,~/.cursor, and~/.geminias processed by thecollect-messages.pyscript. - Boundary markers: The skill instructions specify filtering for human-typed messages and paraphrasing findings rather than quoting raw transcript text, though the effectiveness of these boundaries depends on the model's adherence during the mining process.
- Capability inventory: The skill has the capability to modify project instruction files (like
AGENTS.mdandCLAUDE.md) and create or edit other agent skills using thecreate-agent-skillandwriting-for-agentstools. - Sanitization: While the collection script filters for human-typed messages, the subsequent 'mining' step involves interpreting transcripts which may contain unsanitized reasoning or tool results from previous sessions that could contain malicious instructions.
Audit Metadata