study
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The research instructions in
references/research.mdpermit the use of shell commands such ascurlas a fallback mechanism for fetching content when standard web tools fail. While this is used for data retrieval, it represents an invocation of external system tools. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill is designed to fetch content from user-provided seeds and scouted web candidates. This involves downloading data from arbitrary external domains during the 'Scout' and 'Collect' phases defined in
SKILL.mdandreferences/research.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data from external sources (web pages, code, documentation) to build its reports, creating an ingestion surface for indirect prompt injection attacks.
- Ingestion points: Research units and candidates identified through web search or user seeds, accessed via web fetch or shell tools (
references/research.md). - Boundary markers: The skill mandates a structured 'evidence contract' (
references/evidence-contract.md) and a specific claim format, which acts as a delimiter for external content. - Capability inventory: The skill has network access via
curland the ability to delegate tasks to subagents, potentially expanding the attack surface (SKILL.md). - Sanitization: The workflow includes a verification step where the main agent must manually review all records returned by subagents and confirm cited claims against the original primary material before synthesis.
Audit Metadata