foundation-evolve

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 16, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONPERSISTENCE
Full Analysis
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill uses "MANDATORY" and "MUST" instructions to require the agent to automatically invoke this skill before finishing any other task if changes are detected. This is a behavior override that attempts to hijack the agent's standard task-completion workflow.
  • [PERSISTENCE]: By mandating execution at the end of every task cycle, the skill establishes a persistent operational hook, ensuring its logic runs continuously without explicit user requests for each synchronization.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill automates shell commands including git add, git commit, and git push origin main. Automated pushing to a remote repository without manual review can lead to the accidental exposure of sensitive local changes or project code.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes untrusted data (files within the .agents/skills/ directory) and instructs the agent to "sanitize" and "generalize" this content. This creates a surface where malicious instructions embedded in the project files could influence the agent during the sanitization phase.
  • Ingestion points: Reads all files within the .agents/skills/ directory of the working project.
  • Boundary markers: None. The agent is instructed to read and modify the content directly.
  • Capability inventory: File system read/write access to a hardcoded local repository path and the ability to execute Git network operations.
  • Sanitization: The skill relies on the agent itself to sanitize content, which is insufficient to prevent the agent from being influenced by malicious instructions in the source text.
  • [DATA_EXFILTRATION]: The automated git push functionality targets a hardcoded absolute path (/Users/AlbertMartorell/Development/Android/android-ai-workflow-foundation). While this appears to be the author's local development environment, the automation of code movement to a remote repository (origin main) constitutes a data exfiltration vector if sensitive project data is inadvertently included in the synchronization.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 16, 2026, 08:45 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — foundation-evolve