huashu-skill-updater
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 27, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMPERSISTENCECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PERSISTENCE]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdexplicitly suggest that the user or agent configure acronjob (e.g.,0 9 1 * * python3 ...) to run the update check script automatically every month. This is a persistence mechanism that allows the skill's code to maintain a presence and execute on a schedule without manual intervention. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The included script
scripts/check_updates.pyutilizessubprocess.runto invoke system-levelgitcommands (such asls-remoteandrev-parse) to interact with remote and local repositories. While these are necessary for the skill's primary function of update checking, they involve the execution of shell-level operations. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill possesses an attack surface for indirect prompt injection as it ingests and processes metadata from external files located within the skills directory.
- Ingestion points: The
scripts/check_updates.pyscript reads and parses.huashu-skill-meta.jsonfiles from various subdirectories to identify repository URLs and commit hashes. - Boundary markers: No specific delimiters or safety instructions are used to separate the metadata content from the agent's processing logic.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute Git subprocesses, read and write local files (e.g.,
.last-update-check), and interpolate data from metadata files into the agent's output context. - Sanitization: The script relies on standard JSON parsing but does not implement robust validation or sanitization for the
repoorsubdirfields before using them in command arguments or displaying them to the user.
Audit Metadata