research-intelligence
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 6, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits a high surface area for Indirect Prompt Injection (Category 8). It is designed to ingest and process untrusted content from various external sources, including public web pages, community forums (Reddit, Hacker News), and document files (PDF, DOCX, XLSX, etc.) via the
markitdown-document-ingestioncompanion skill. - Ingestion Points: Mentions fetching content from 'Hermes web search', 'Jina Reader', 'yt-dlp metadata', and external documents.
- Boundary Markers: The instructions lack technical delimiters (e.g., XML tags or specific boundary markers) to isolate external content from the agent's instructions, though they do provide structural guidelines for the agent to separate facts from interpretation.
- Capability Inventory: The skill has access to shell execution (
python3,gh,yt-dlp) and file conversion tools, which could be abused if an injected instruction successfully manipulates the agent. - Sanitization: No explicit sanitization or filtering of external content is described beyond the use of Markdown conversion.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions for the agent (or user) to execute several CLI tools and scripts.
- Evidence: Mentions using
yt-dlpfor metadata,ghfor GitHub API checks, and specifically instructs runningpython3 tools/source_reach_doctor.pyfrom the repository root to verify the environment. - Concern: The script
tools/source_reach_doctor.pyis not provided within the skill package for review, constituting the execution of unverified local code.
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