skills/alexander-danilenko/cortex-claude-code-plugins/coderabbit-resolve-feedback/Gen Agent Trust Hub
coderabbit-resolve-feedback
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 12, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is designed to ingest and act upon comments from the CodeRabbit bot on GitHub. This creates an indirect prompt injection surface where a malicious user or a compromised bot could include instructions designed to hijack the agent's behavior.
- Ingestion points: Pull request comments, review threads, and review bodies are fetched from the GitHub API using the
scripts/fetch-coderabbit-feedbackscript and processed by the agent and its subagents. - Boundary markers: Both
SKILL.md(Rule 4) andreferences/worker.mdcontain explicit instructions to treat comment text as untrusted input and never to execute commands found within them. - Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read and write files, execute shell commands (git, gh, bash), and run project-specific test or validation suites.
- Sanitization: The skill relies on the AI model's adherence to instructions rather than programmatic sanitization of the input data.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill performs extensive shell command execution to interact with the repository and the GitHub API.
- Evidence: The orchestrator in
SKILL.mdrunsgitcommands (fetch, merge-base, status, commit, push),ghCLI commands (pr view, pr comment, api), and executes a local bash script. - Evidence: The skill executes project-specific validation tools (tests, typecheck, lint) which involves running code present in the target repository.
Audit Metadata