clone-repo
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jul 1, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to execute shell commands (
git ls-remoteandgit subtree add) using arguments provided directly by the user (<url>,<name>,<branch>). This creates a risk of command injection if the inputs are not strictly validated or escaped before being passed to the shell. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill facilitates Indirect Prompt Injection by design. It automates the process of importing untrusted third-party source code into the agent's active context to be used as 'Reference material'.
- Ingestion points:
SKILL.md(Steps 2 and 3) defines the process for pulling remote content via Git. - Boundary markers: The skill adds a '## Reference repositories' header to
AGENTS.md, but does not provide explicit instructions for the agent to ignore or sanitize instructions found within the imported source code. - Capability inventory: The agent possesses
Bash,Read,Write, andEditcapabilities, which could be abused if the imported code contains malicious instructions that the agent follows. - Sanitization: There is no mechanism described to sanitize, scan, or validate the content of the external repository before it is integrated into the workspace.
Audit Metadata