fix-pipeline

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (!command) in SKILL.md to automatically run shell commands upon loading. Specifically, the commands gh run list --branch $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD) and gh run view --branch $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD) ... use command substitution to include the current branch name. If a local branch is named using shell metacharacters (e.g., a branch named main; touch exploit), the shell will execute the injected command in the user's environment.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes data from external GitHub Actions logs.
  • Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the gh run view command output, which is populated into the <latest_run_details> section of SKILL.md at load time.
  • Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (<latest_run_details>) to delimit the data, but it lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within those logs.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including gh api (allowing arbitrary GitHub API calls), git operations, and the EnterPlanMode tool for proposed code modifications.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of log sanitization or filtering to prevent the agent from following instructions hidden in CI logs (e.g., in failing test output or build logs).
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 08:20 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — fix-pipeline