fix-pipeline
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes dynamic context injection (
!command) inSKILL.mdto automatically run shell commands upon loading. Specifically, the commandsgh run list --branch $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD)andgh run view --branch $(git rev-parse --abbrev-ref HEAD) ...use command substitution to include the current branch name. If a local branch is named using shell metacharacters (e.g., a branch namedmain; touch exploit), the shell will execute the injected command in the user's environment. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is susceptible to indirect prompt injection because it ingests and analyzes data from external GitHub Actions logs.
- Ingestion points: External data enters the agent context via the
gh run viewcommand output, which is populated into the<latest_run_details>section ofSKILL.mdat load time. - Boundary markers: The skill uses XML-style tags (
<latest_run_details>) to delimit the data, but it lacks explicit instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within those logs. - Capability inventory: The skill has access to powerful tools including
gh api(allowing arbitrary GitHub API calls),gitoperations, and theEnterPlanModetool for proposed code modifications. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of log sanitization or filtering to prevent the agent from following instructions hidden in CI logs (e.g., in failing test output or build logs).
Audit Metadata