jobsearch-workflow-tailor-apply

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 1, 2026

Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches external job postings via URLs or pasted text, which introduces a potential attack surface for indirect prompt injection where an attacker could embed instructions to manipulate the agent's behavior.
  • Ingestion points: In the 'Intake' section of SKILL.md, the agent is instructed to fetch posting content from links or pasted text.
  • Boundary markers: Explicit delimiters for the ingested external content are not defined in the instructions.
  • Capability inventory: The skill has the ability to read sensitive configuration files (jobsearch-connections.md, job-search-os-profile.md), write local files (.docx, .pdf, .txt), create Gmail drafts, and publish/update artifacts using Claude's storage capability (window.claude.use('db') in templates/application-board.html).
  • Sanitization: The skill implements a 'Compliance pass' in SKILL.md that checks for traceability of metrics and accomplishments to the user's profile, providing a verification layer against hallucinated or injected claims in the output.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Nov 1, 2026, 08:46 AM