pimp-my-shadcn

Warn

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026

Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands including curl, magick (ImageMagick), and shadcn@latest. It also uses agent-browser to control a headless browser for scraping.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches data, images, and code from user-provided URLs and third-party registries. Specifically, it suggests using third-party registries such as reui.io to add components to the project.
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses shadcn@latest add with the -o (overwrite) and -y (yes) flags to download and install components from remote registries. This allows remote content to overwrite local project files without manual verification.
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses agent-browser eval to execute arbitrary JavaScript code on remote, untrusted websites to extract computed styles and DOM information.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the web and uses it to drive code generation and project configuration.
  • Ingestion points: External reference URLs and image files processed in capture.md via agent-browser and curl.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the scraped reference content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes to the project root (DESIGN.md) and component directories, and it can execute shell commands (shadcn, magick, agent-browser).
  • Sanitization: Absent. While it mentions stripping HTML tags for text copy, the results of agent-browser eval and pixel sampling are used directly to generate code and tokens.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
MEDIUM
Analyzed
Sep 7, 2026, 08:01 AM