pimp-my-shadcn
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 7, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes extensive use of system commands including
curl,magick(ImageMagick), andshadcn@latest. It also usesagent-browserto control a headless browser for scraping. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Fetches data, images, and code from user-provided URLs and third-party registries. Specifically, it suggests using third-party registries such as
reui.ioto add components to the project. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
shadcn@latest addwith the-o(overwrite) and-y(yes) flags to download and install components from remote registries. This allows remote content to overwrite local project files without manual verification. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill uses
agent-browser evalto execute arbitrary JavaScript code on remote, untrusted websites to extract computed styles and DOM information. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection as it ingests untrusted data from the web and uses it to drive code generation and project configuration.
- Ingestion points: External reference URLs and image files processed in
capture.mdviaagent-browserandcurl. - Boundary markers: Absent. The skill does not implement delimiters or instructions to ignore potential commands embedded in the scraped reference content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can perform file writes to the project root (
DESIGN.md) and component directories, and it can execute shell commands (shadcn,magick,agent-browser). - Sanitization: Absent. While it mentions stripping HTML tags for text copy, the results of
agent-browser evaland pixel sampling are used directly to generate code and tokens.
Audit Metadata