releasing
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Aug 18, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEPROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill fetches and processes untrusted data from GitHub Pull Request titles and descriptions, which could be used to manipulate the agent's output during the release note drafting process.
- Ingestion points: Step 4 utilizes
gh pr list --json number,title,bodyto retrieve external content from merged Pull Requests. - Boundary markers: The skill lacks explicit instructions or delimiters to isolate the PR content or warn the agent to ignore potentially malicious instructions embedded within that data.
- Capability inventory: The skill has significant local and remote capabilities, including executing project-specific checks via
make check, committing/tagging the repository, and updating live GitHub releases viagh release edit. - Sanitization: There is no evidence of filtering or sanitizing the PR metadata before it is interpolated into the agent's context for summarization.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill executes various shell commands to manage the software lifecycle.
- Evidence: Uses
gitfor repository state checks, tagging, and pushing changes. - Evidence: Uses
gh(GitHub CLI) for querying Pull Requests and managing releases. - Evidence: Executes
make check, which runs the local project's validation suite. This is a standard and expected part of a release workflow.
Audit Metadata