feishu-card
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data and interpolates it into card templates using Markdown rendering, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent or deceive users.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data is injected into templates via placeholders like
{{description}}and{{impact}}inreferences/card-alert.json,{{anomalies_section}}and{{actions_list}}inreferences/card-morning-briefing.json, and{{details}}inreferences/card-skill-test.json. - Boundary markers: Absent. The templates do not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the interpolated data.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts for authentication and perform network operations (POST/PATCH) to the Feishu API.
- Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or filtering logic for the content injected into the
lark_mdblocks. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local script,
./scripts/get_feishu_token.sh, which is executed to manage Feishu authentication tokens. This is a standard practice for this skill's use case but involves shell command invocation.
Audit Metadata