feishu-card

Pass

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 27, 2026

Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external data and interpolates it into card templates using Markdown rendering, creating a surface for indirect instructions to influence the agent or deceive users.
  • Ingestion points: Untrusted data is injected into templates via placeholders like {{description}} and {{impact}} in references/card-alert.json, {{anomalies_section}} and {{actions_list}} in references/card-morning-briefing.json, and {{details}} in references/card-skill-test.json.
  • Boundary markers: Absent. The templates do not use delimiters or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the interpolated data.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute local scripts for authentication and perform network operations (POST/PATCH) to the Feishu API.
  • Sanitization: Absent. There is no evidence of escaping or filtering logic for the content injected into the lark_md blocks.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill relies on a local script, ./scripts/get_feishu_token.sh, which is executed to manage Feishu authentication tokens. This is a standard practice for this skill's use case but involves shell command invocation.
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
SAFE
Analyzed
Sep 27, 2026, 12:36 AM