remotion-graphics

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs the agent to clone a third-party GitHub repository (https://github.com/agamm/video-agent) and run the agent within that environment. This involves executing scripts and code from an external source that is not verified as a trusted vendor or well-known service.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Executing the Remotion render commands triggers an automatic download of a headless Chromium browser binary (~150–300 MB) from external servers. The skill also requires running npm install, which downloads numerous packages from the public npm registry.
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill's workflow depends on executing multiple shell commands, including npm install, npx remotion render, and ffmpeg. These commands are used to manage dependencies and perform heavy video processing tasks.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes external transcript data and cue sheets to determine the timing and content of animated graphics, creating a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: Transcription data (--words transcript) and cue sheets parsed by FinalEdit.tsx in the referenced repository.
  • Boundary markers: No explicit delimiters or instructions are provided to the agent to treat transcript content as untrusted data.
  • Capability inventory: The agent has access to shell execution via npm, npx, and ffmpeg to process the data.
  • Sanitization: There is no evidence of sanitization or validation of the transcript content before it is interpolated into animation frame calculations and command arguments.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Nov 9, 2026, 12:32 PM