yt-retention
Warn
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Nov 9, 2026
Risk Level: MEDIUMDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The script
retention.pydynamically modifies the Python search path to import a module (deadair) from a sibling directory (../yt-edit). - Evidence:
sys.path.insert(0, os.path.join(os.path.dirname(os.path.abspath(__file__)), "..", "yt-edit"))inretention.py. - Risk: This allows execution of code from a path computed at runtime. This is an unverifiable dependency that could lead to the execution of malicious code if the local environment or sibling directories are compromised.
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill ingests untrusted data from YouTube retention CSVs and SRT transcript files, which are then reflected into the agent's context.
- Ingestion points:
retention.csvandtranscript.srt(specified via the--transcriptargument) are read inretention.py. - Boundary markers: Absent; the extracted text from the transcript is printed directly into the output consumed by the agent without delimiters.
- Capability inventory: The
retention.pyscript has file-read capabilities (CSV/SRT) and prints to stdout. While the script itself lacks network/shell capabilities, the agent interpreting the output may have such access. - Sanitization: Absent; the script truncates transcript snippets to 140 characters but does not sanitize or escape the text to prevent embedded prompt injection attacks.
Audit Metadata