building-python-mcp-servers
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Oct 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill describes an architecture where an agent processes untrusted external data (file paths and CLI arguments), which represents a potential surface for indirect prompt injection.
- Ingestion points: The documentation includes functions like
read_config(path: str)andvalidate_dir(path: str)inSKILL.mdthat accept string inputs from the LLM client. - Boundary markers: The skill provides explicit security warnings, stating "Treat all tool I/O as untrusted (prompt injection)" and advising that "every input is untrusted."
- Capability inventory: The examples demonstrate powerful capabilities including file system reads (
Path.read_text) and subprocess execution (subprocess.run). - Sanitization: The instructions prioritize security by recommending path validation (checking for absolute paths), use of
shlex.split, and avoidingshell=Trueto prevent command injection. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides templates for executing system commands via the Python
subprocessmodule. It pro-actively mitigates execution risks by instructing users to avoid shell interpolation and use argv lists for safety.
Audit Metadata