android-app-submission
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill provides instructions to execute various shell commands for generating release keystores, building the Android App Bundle (AAB), and verifying signatures.
- Evidence: Commands such as
keytool -genkeypair,./gradlew :app:bundleRelease, andjarsigner -verifyare listed in the prerequisites section ofSKILL.md. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill utilizes JavaScript execution through a browser automation tool to interact with the Google Play Console user interface, particularly to handle elements that are difficult to interact with via standard clicks.
- Evidence: The instructions explicitly use
browser_evaluate()to perform clicks on buttons identified bydebug-idattributes inSKILL.md. - [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The workflow relies on the content of a local
CHANGELOG.mdfile to provide the text for Play Store release notes, creating a surface for potential injection if the file is modified by an untrusted source. - Ingestion points: The agent is instructed to read the
CHANGELOG.mdfile at the repository root as the source of truth for the Play release notes. - Boundary markers: There are no specified boundary markers or instructions for the agent to ignore potentially malicious content within the changelog text.
- Capability inventory: The skill uses Playwright MCP tools like
browser_typeandbrowser_evaluateto input the changelog data into the Google Play Console. - Sanitization: No validation or sanitization steps are described for the data extracted from the
CHANGELOG.mdfile before it is used in automation steps.
Audit Metadata