ios-auto-release
Audited by Socket on Sep 4, 2026
2 alerts found:
Anomalyx2SUSPICIOUS: the skill’s core behavior matches iOS release automation, and its data flows target official GitHub/Apple services, so it is not fundamentally incompatible with its stated purpose. However, it performs high-impact autonomous release submission, reads fallback org credentials from a fixed local path, and centralizes signing secrets in CI while also relying on some unpinned/third-party workflow components. Risk is significant but driven by powerful release automation and credential handling, not clear malicious intent.
No explicit malware or covert exfiltration is evident in this fragment. However, the design deliberately turns remote Git branch contents into locally executed code (scripts/install_on_device.sh) and propagates $ROOT/.env (noted to contain signing keys) into the temporary worktree. If the tracked branch/repo is compromised or malicious commits are introduced, this can enable high-impact unauthorized actions during the install step. Security hinges on strong trust controls for origin/$BRANCH (branch protection, signed/verified commits, and tightly governed release automation).