skills/alfredang/skills/xlsx/Gen Agent Trust Hub

xlsx

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and library injection to bypass environment restrictions.
  • scripts/office/soffice.py contains a C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) which is written to the temporary directory and compiled using gcc -shared -fPIC to create lo_socket_shim.so.
  • The resulting shared object is then injected into the LibreOffice process via the LD_PRELOAD environment variable to shim socket-related system calls (socket, listen, accept).
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes several calls to the system shell to manage Office processes and recalculate formulas.
  • scripts/recalc.py executes soffice with headless arguments and a custom macro to force formula evaluation.
  • scripts/office/soffice.py executes gcc to compile the socket shim.
  • scripts/office/validators/redlining.py executes git diff to perform document comparisons.
  • [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect injection by processing external data with high-privilege tools.
  • Ingestion points: Data enters the context via pd.read_excel() and load_workbook() calls described in SKILL.md.
  • Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify delimiters for untrusted spreadsheet content.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses (scripts/recalc.py, scripts/office/soffice.py), write to the filesystem (scripts/office/pack.py), and load arbitrary shared libraries.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization logic for ingested tabular data is present in the analyzed scripts.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Sep 4, 2026, 07:29 AM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — xlsx