xlsx
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 4, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHDYNAMIC_EXECUTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill performs runtime compilation and library injection to bypass environment restrictions.
scripts/office/soffice.pycontains a C source string (_SHIM_SOURCE) which is written to the temporary directory and compiled usinggcc -shared -fPICto createlo_socket_shim.so.- The resulting shared object is then injected into the LibreOffice process via the
LD_PRELOADenvironment variable to shim socket-related system calls (socket,listen,accept). - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill makes several calls to the system shell to manage Office processes and recalculate formulas.
scripts/recalc.pyexecutessofficewith headless arguments and a custom macro to force formula evaluation.scripts/office/soffice.pyexecutesgccto compile the socket shim.scripts/office/validators/redlining.pyexecutesgit diffto perform document comparisons.- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill creates a surface for indirect injection by processing external data with high-privilege tools.
- Ingestion points: Data enters the context via
pd.read_excel()andload_workbook()calls described inSKILL.md. - Boundary markers: None identified; instructions do not specify delimiters for untrusted spreadsheet content.
- Capability inventory: The skill can execute subprocesses (
scripts/recalc.py,scripts/office/soffice.py), write to the filesystem (scripts/office/pack.py), and load arbitrary shared libraries. - Sanitization: No sanitization logic for ingested tabular data is present in the analyzed scripts.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata