codex-cli
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on May 3, 2026
Risk Level: SAFECOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill orchestrates the
codexCLI tool to perform code generation, refactoring, and analysis. It utilizes powerful flags such as--full-autofor autonomous file modification and--sandbox danger-full-accessfor tasks requiring network or system-level permissions. - [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: The skill configures a Model Context Protocol (MCP) server by downloading the
@upstash/context7-mcppackage vianpx. This dependency is used to fetch and query external documentation from OpenAI and other sources. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill exhibits an attack surface for indirect prompt injection, as it is designed to ingest and process external content which may contain malicious instructions.
- Ingestion points: Untrusted data enters the agent context through file reading (e.g.,
src/auth/login.py),git diffoutputs, and linting error reports interpolated into execution prompts. - Boundary markers: The instructions do not demonstrate the use of clear delimiters or 'ignore' instructions to prevent the agent from following commands embedded within the processed data.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to sensitive capabilities including filesystem writes and system-level execution via the
codexbinary. - Sanitization: There is no documented mechanism for sanitizing or validating external data before it is included in prompts for the model.
Audit Metadata