worktree-pr

Fail

Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 24, 2026

Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONEXTERNAL_DOWNLOADSPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
  • [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructs users to run wt config shell install followed by source ~/.zshrc. This modification to shell profile files constitutes a persistence mechanism that can alter the user's environment or execute code automatically in every new shell session.
  • [EXTERNAL_DOWNLOADS]: Recommends the installation of max-sixty/worktrunk/wt via Homebrew. This repository is not associated with a trusted organization or well-known service, introducing a dependency on unverified external code that could pose a supply chain risk.
  • [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The ralph worktree-fix command ingests PR review comments as context for applying fixes, creating a surface for indirect prompt injection.
  • Ingestion points: External GitHub PR review comments are read into the agent context via the ralph worktree-fix workflow.
  • Boundary markers: Absent; the instructions do not implement delimiters or warnings to ignore instructions embedded in the external comments.
  • Capability inventory: The skill can execute shell commands (git, gh, wt), modify local files, and perform network operations via the GitHub CLI.
  • Sanitization: No sanitization or validation of the untrusted comment content is described or implemented.
Recommendations
  • AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata
Risk Level
HIGH
Analyzed
Jun 24, 2026, 08:21 PM
Security Audit — agent-trust-hub — worktree-pr