gpu-kernel-episode-loop
Pass
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Sep 24, 2026
Risk Level: SAFEINDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTIONCOMMAND_EXECUTIONDYNAMIC_EXECUTION
Full Analysis
- [INDIRECT_PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill processes potentially untrusted data from multiple sources.
- Ingestion points: The skill reads from
definition.json,workload.jsonl,memory/*.json, responses fromgpu-wiki/tools/query_nl.py, and content fetched from thepublic_web. - Boundary markers: The instructions specify that the sandbox environment isolates inputs and the driver deletes input JSONs before importing candidate code.
- Capability inventory: The skill utilizes
tools/sandbox.pyfor code execution and records experiment results using<JOURNAL_CLI>andtools/iteration_trace.py. - Sanitization: Explicit instructions are provided to exclude credentials, private URLs, and raw tool output from telemetry.
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill defines a loop that requires executing multiple local scripts and shell commands.
- Evidence: Usage of
python tools/sandbox.py,bash tools/profile_nvidia.sh,python3 tools/iteration_trace.py, and the variable command<JOURNAL_CLI>. These are used for telemetry, profiling, and journaling. - [DYNAMIC_EXECUTION]: The skill facilitates the creation and execution of code at runtime as part of the optimization process.
- Evidence: The agent is instructed to modify
kernel.pyand is permitted to create a local fallback driver in the<PROFILE_DIR>/harness/directory, which is then executed by the profiling tools.
Audit Metadata