e2e
Fail
Audited by Gen Agent Trust Hub on Jun 16, 2026
Risk Level: HIGHCOMMAND_EXECUTIONREMOTE_CODE_EXECUTIONPROMPT_INJECTION
Full Analysis
- [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The skill instructions in
SKILL.mdand thescripts/e2e-cleanup.shscript utilizesudo rm -rfto delete directories, which involves high-privilege file system operations that could be dangerous if paths are manipulated. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
scripts/e2e-cleanup.shscript executesdocker rm -f $(docker ps -aq), which is a highly destructive command that forcefully removes all Docker containers on the host system regardless of whether they belong to the test suite. - [COMMAND_EXECUTION]: The
reference.mdfile documents steps that allow the agent to execute arbitrary shell commands and create shell scripts (e.g.,execute {N} commands {cmd},create the shell script file {name}). This capability allows for unrestricted command execution within the testing environment. - [REMOTE_CODE_EXECUTION]: The testing framework is designed to parse and execute commands specified in
.featurefiles. This creates a direct path for code execution based on the content of external data files provided to the agent. - [PROMPT_INJECTION]: The skill is vulnerable to indirect prompt injection via the processing of untrusted
.featurefiles. - Ingestion points: The agent reads and interprets instructions from
case.featurefiles located in thetest_cases/directory. - Boundary markers: There are no documented boundary markers or instructions to ignore embedded commands within the processed feature files.
- Capability inventory: The agent has access to powerful tools including shell command execution, script creation, and privileged file deletion (
sudo rm -rf). - Sanitization: No sanitization or validation logic is described for the commands or scripts extracted from the feature files before they are executed.
Recommendations
- AI detected serious security threats
Audit Metadata